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ANY TAX ADVICE IN THIS COMMUNICATION IS NOT INTENDED OR WRITTEN BY 
KPMG TO BE USED, AND CANNOT BE USED, BY A CLIENT OR ANY OTHER PERSON 
OR ENTITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF (i) AVOIDING PENALTIES THAT MAY BE 
IMPOSED ON ANY TAXPAYER OR (ii) PROMOTING, MARKETING OR 
RECOMMENDING TO ANOTHER PARTY ANY MATTERS ADDRESSED HEREIN. 
You (and your employees, representatives, or agents) may disclose to any and all persons, 
without limitation, the tax treatment or tax structure, or both, of any transaction described in 
the associated materials we provide to you, including, but not limited to, any tax opinions, 
memoranda, or other tax analyses contained in those materials.
The information contained herein is of a general nature and based on authorities that are 
subject to change. Applicability of the information to specific situations should be 
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The “Dealer” Property Standard
Section 1221(1) applies where property is “held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to 
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.” 
Section 1221(1) can be broken down into three separate requirements: 
— the taxpayer primarily intends to hold the property for sale; 
— the sales occur in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s trade or business; and
— the sales are to “customers.” 
- The “customer” requirement is easily satisfied.  Pointer v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 
906 (1967), aff’d 419 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1969). 
Primary Intent is 
“Held for Sale”
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Primary Intent is “Held for Sale”
In Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 604 (1966), the Supreme Court determined that “held 
primarily for sale” means “of first importance” or “principally.”
Sales in the 
Ordinary Course 
of the Taxpayer’s 
Trade or Business
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Sales in the Ordinary Course of the Taxpayer’s Trade or 
Business
Early cases indicate that frequency and continuity are important tests in 
determining that a party is engaged in a trade or business.  
— Williams v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1958); Thomas v. Commissioner, 254 
F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1958); Reese v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1980); Buono 
v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 187 (1980).
Later cases seem to take a very broad view of “trade or business” where a taxpayer 
acquires property for the purpose of reselling – repudiating the “one-free-bite” 
theory.  
— Jersey Land & Development Corp. v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1976); S&H 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 234 (1982); Baumgart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
1983-738; Morley v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1206 (1986); Compare Pleasant Summit 
Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1988).  
Factors Used in 
the Analysis 
10© 2018 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. 
Factors Used in the Analysis
Courts have identified a number of factors that may be relevant in determining 
whether property should be treated as “dealer” property.  See Winthrop, 417 F.2d 
905 (5th Cir. 1969).
— The taxpayer's purpose in acquiring the property; 
— the purpose for which the property was subsequently held; 
— the taxpayer's everyday business and the relationship of the income from the property 
to total income; 
— the frequency, continuity, and substantiality of sales of property; the extent of 
developing and improving the property to increase the sales; 
— the extent to which the taxpayer used advertising, promotion, or other activities to 
increase sales; 
— the use of a business office for the sale of property; 
— the character and degree of supervision or control the taxpayer exercised over any 
representative selling the property; and 
— the time and effort the taxpayer habitually devoted to the sales. 
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Sales in the Ordinary Course of the Taxpayer’s Trade or 
Business
The relevance of, and weight given to, the specific factors vary based upon the 
circumstances and the context in which property is being sold.
— The analysis used in the context of a subdivider, condo developer, etc. varies materially 
from the analysis for commercial office developers.
Issues Specific to 
Residential 
Developers
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Frequency of Sales – A Super Factor?
Some cases addressing residential developer/subdivider scenarios identify the 
“frequency and substantiality” of sales as the “most important factor.”  See, e.g., 
Biedenharn Realty Co., 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976); Byram, 705 F.2d 1418 (5th Cir. 
1983).
However, there are numerous examples where such a developer sells property in 
bulk and is found to be a dealer. 
— In order for a single bulk sale to give rise to dealer status after a significant holding 
period, there generally has been a clear and continuing intent to sell coupled with 
material activities aimed at developing the property.  See, e.g., Allen, 2014-1 U.S.T.C. 
¶50,300 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (single parcel held for 11 years was dealer property where, 
during this period, taxpayer consistently pursued efforts to develop the property for 
sale); Fargo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-96 (single parcel held 13 years for 
development of townhomes; unsolicited offer for the entire parcel after 13 years gave 
rise to dealer sale).  
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Frequency of Sales – A Super Factor?
When a taxpayer undertakes activity relating to zoning, permitting, etc. with respect 
to a single property but makes no physical improvements, there is authority holding 
that such property may not be dealer property even though the taxpayer always 
intended to sell such property.
— Buono v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 187 (1980) (taxpayer purchased residential 
development property with intent to sell in 1 ½ years – once received approval for 
subdivision, sold property – lack of frequent and substantial sales activities prevented 
from being in trade or business, and solitary nature of acquisition and single sale 
precluded finding that was engaged in substantial and frequent sales activities).
— Buono court distinguished Jersey Land & Development Corp v. U.S., 539 F.2d 311 (3rd 
Cir. 1976), where court “concluded that the taxayer’s acquisition, improvement, and 
sale of the property, which was part of a pattern of similar activities carried on by 
associated corporations, established that the taxpayer held the tract primarily for sale in 
the ordinary course of its business”  See also Jarrett, T.C. Memo 1993-516 (taxpayer 
engaged in broader real estate business).
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Improvements to Property
Cases have highlighted the significance of constructing property improvements, 
such as roads, sewage equipment, etc., as negative factors in the dealer analysis.  
See, e.g., Gault, T.C. Memo. 1963-178; Kaltreider, 255 F.2d 833 (3rd Cir. 1958); 
Sanders, 740 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1984); Boree, 837 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2016).  
But it appears clear that the mere fact that property is improved does not, standing 
alone, cause the property to become dealer property.  See, e.g., Gartrell, 619 F.2d 
1150 (6th Cir. 1980); Simpson, T.C. Memo 1962-71.
See generally B. Schippel, Developing Without a Shovel: A New Look at the “Old, 
Familiar, Recurring, Vexing and Often Elusive” Problem, J. of P-thru Entities (July 1, 
2006). 
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Improvements to Property
The Tax Court in Buono, 74 T.C. 187 (1980), made the following statements, 
seemingly leaving open the possiblity that a subdivider selling in bulk might avoid 
dealer status even after making significant improvements to the subject property.
— “In our view, Marlboro Improvement's efforts in obtaining subdivision approval and 
selling the major parcel as a single tract, coupled with two separate dispositions of the 
highway and shopping center parcels, do not put the corporation in a trade or business. 
Admittedly, subdivision of the tract into half-acre building lots takes us in the direction of 
the indistinct line of demarcation between investment and dealership. It may confidently 
be expected that eventually another case will present us with a fact situation where the 
taxpayer not only subdivides, but also physically lays out streets and puts in utilities 
before disposing of the tract in one single transaction. That decision, of course, is for 
another day.” 
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Contracting for Improvements After Sale
The courts seem to analyze differently situations where a taxpayer agrees to 
construct improvements on the property on behalf of the buyer after sale of the 
property.
— If the property is raw land at the time of sale, courts have given less significance to 
post-sale improvements even if the seller is required to provide such improvements 
pursuant to the terms of the sales contract.  See Reithmeyer, 26 T.C. 804 (1956); Wray, 
T.C. Memo. 1978-488; Paullus, T.C. Memo. 1996-419; Pool, T.C. Memo. 2014-3.
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Bifurcating Dealer and Non-Dealer Property
The court in Suburban Realty, 615 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1980), acknowledged that, in 
some circumstances it may be possible to establish that certain properties are held 
for investment, but “the burden is on the taxpayer to establish that the parcels held 
primarily for investment were segregated from other properties held primarily for 
sale. The mere lack of development activity with respect to the large property does 
not sufficiently separate those parts from the whole to meet the taxpayer’s burden.”
There are cases recognizing that a party can hold different parcels with different 
purposes. See Wood, 276 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1960); Maddux Const., 54 T.C. 1278 
(1970); Eline Realty, 35 T.C. 1 (1960); Malat, 275 F. Supp. 358 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
— These cases all involved property that clearly was designated to a different purpose 
(either rental, or property that could not be developed), and the separate parcels were 
sold to separate buyers under different circumstances.  
Issues Specific to 
Commercial 
Property
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Commercial Property Standard is Different 
Courts recognize that the analysis with respect to commercial properties is different 
from residential developments (where most of the cases arise), such that the factors 
in the typical residential sale cases (e.g., frequency of sales, soliciation of sale, 
sales office, etc.) are not necessarily determinative.  See Jersey Land & 
Development Corp. v. U.S., 539 F.2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1976); Pleasant Summit Land Corp. 
v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1988); Pennroad Corp. v. Commissioner, 261 
F.2d 325 (3rd Cir. 1958). 
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Primary Intent in the Commercial Context
In analyzing intent as to holding property, one must look to see what is the primary 
reason for holding the property.  
— The fact that parties are currently renting property does not mean that they are holding 
the property primarily for rental.  
— Where rental property is being sold, courts have focused on what was the taxpayer’s 
primary intent in acquiring or constructing the property: (1) to hold for rental, or (2) to 
hold for sale.  See Victory Housing No. 2 v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 
1953); Grace v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1313 (1961); Cousins Properties, Inc. 
v. U.S., 77-2 USTC ¶9508 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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Primary Intent in the Commercial Context
Although the cases are not explicit, when property is sold fairly soon (i.e., 1-4 years) 
after acquisition or construction, there has been significant attention paid to 
determining the initial “intent”, since the short holding period is somewhat 
inconsistent with an intent to hold for investment.  
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Primary Intent in the Commercial Context
The cases holding favorably for the taxpayer generally have found a change in 
circumstances that have led to the sale. 
— Victory Housing No. 2 v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1953) (change in 
corporate policy indicating a desire to make property available for ownership by 
veterans). 
— Rouse v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 70 (1962) (became difficult to locate desirable 
tenants). 
— Cousins Properties, Inc. v. U.S., 77-2 USTC ¶9508 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (numerous properties, 
all with changed circumstances; court stated: “If the evidence indicates that at the prior 
period the taxpayer would not have made the sale in question but for the occurrence of 
a changed condition or a sudden and unexpected opportunity it will be presumed that 
he was not holding the property ‘primarily’ for sale.”). 
— Cottle v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 467 (1987) (other owners in four-plex development 
began selling, and taxpayer feared he would lose ability to control activities in 
development, which in turn would hurt value or his properties).
— Other “liquidation of investment” cases: Heller Trust, 382 F.2d 675; Carter-Colton Cigar 
Co., 9 T.C. 219; Toll v. Comm’r, 32 T.C. 1314. 
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Primary Intent in the Commercial Context
Most of the favorable cases find that the taxpayer was “liquidating” its investments 
due to a change in circumstances.  
— If the initial purpose is to hold the property primarily for sale, the liquidating theory will 
not be available unless intent changed to holding for investment during interim period.  
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Primary Intent in the Commercial Context
Objective evidence is important in determining intent.  
— Important factors include purpose for holding property as “for rental” on mortgage 
application (Grace v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1313 (1961)) or application for 
FHA guarantee of loan (Goldberg v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955)).
— Underwriting, investment committee, and investor documents are important.
In all cases cited above where courts have held that property was capital gain 
property in a context where property was sold relatively soon (1-4 years) after being 
acquired or constructed, no broker had been engaged, and all sales were prompted 
by unsolicited offers.
Cases have looked to activities of related parties in determining intent to taxpayer 
that owns the subject property.  Baumgart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-738; 
Jersey Land & Development Corp. v. U.S., 539 F.2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1976). 
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Primary Intent in the Commercial Context
If efforts in improving and renting property are aimed at making the property more 
marketable for sale, the fact that the property is being rented may not carry 
significant weight in determining whether the property is “held for sale.”
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Sales in the Ordinary Course of the Taxpayer’s Trade or 
Business
Real estate development clearly comprises a trade or business, so issue becomes 
whether development activity encompasses trade or business of selling property.  
— Bush v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1977-75; Heebner v. Commissioner, 280 F.2d 228 
(3rd Cir. 1960); but see Reese v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1980) (assuming 
arguendo that the taxpayer was the builder, developer, and general contractor of the 
project, the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business with respect to the 
isolated project). 
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Sales in the Ordinary Course of the Taxpayer’s Trade or 
Business
Cases that look to taxpayer’s other activities for purposes of determining whether 
the property activities give rise to a trade or business sometimes look to relative 
quantum of efforts with respect to the multiple activities.  
— These cases may not be as relevant where you have a single-purpose entity.  
— But a single-purpose entity can hold property for investment.  Buono v. Commissioner, 
74 T.C. 187 (1980).
Must focus on what is the primary purpose for the taxpayer’s activities in 
determining the nature of the taxpayer’s trade or business activities.
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Policy Arguments in Dealer Analysis
Although not dispositive, courts have looked to whether gain resulted from market 
forces or activities of taxpayer as a factor in determining whether gain was capital 
gain or ordinary income.  
— Jersey Land & Development Corp. v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1976) 
(taxpayer looked to value added by improvements rather than market appreciation, 
indicating that taxpayer held property primarily for sale).  
— Compare U.S. v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1969 (court refused to adopt a per se 
rule denying capital gain treatment where the taxpayer’s efforts, rather than market 
forces, result in property’s appreciation); Buono v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 187 (1980) 
(same).
— Nonetheless, the mere fact that the gain results primarily from market factors will not, 
standing alone, justify capital gain treatment.  Boree, 837 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2016).   
Evaluating a 
Hypothetical
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Hypothetical Underwriting and Sales Scenario
January 1, Year 1:  LLC acquires land.  
— The underwriting pro forma indicates that the strategy most likely to return the highest 
value to investors is to lease-up the building (estimated end of Year 3) one year after 
substantial completion (estimated end of Year 2), with a plan to market the building for 
sale as soon as possible after lease-up (estimated beginning, during or end of  Year 4).  
— The Parties understand that there is significant development, leasing and market risk 
related to the development of a speculative office building development in X Market and 
that the optimal scenario outlined above may or may not go according to plan.
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Hypothetical Underwriting and Sales Scenario
January 1, Year 1 – December 31, Year 2: LLC constructs the building.
January 1, Year 3 – December 31, Year 3: LLC markets the building to tenants and 
leases up the building.  
January 1, Year 4: Based on an analysis of the Project and the underwriting pro 
forma, the Parties decide to direct the LLC to market the building for sale.
Year 4: Building is sold.
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Applying Analysis to Hypothetical
Facts indicate that leasing of property is aimed at making the property more 
attractive for sale, and that income from rent itself will not form a significant part of 
the expected return.
While the LLC holds only a single property, there is significant activity with respect 
to that property in constructing and leasing the property with an eye towards a 
primary reward in the form of a profitable sale.
Although the property ultimately is held for rent for two years after construction, the 
facts indicate a significant risk of a dealer sale. 
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Applying Analysis to Hypothetical
If things don’t work out as planned, and the LLC holds the property for rental for a 
significantly longer period, the facts start to look better.
The intial intent starts to look more ambiguous if the property is actually held for 
rental for a significant period of time.
The longer holding period also provides some indication that profit with respect to 
the property derives from market forces instead of efforts in constructing and 
leasing the property.
Nonetheless, if the evidence indicates that the LLC always intends to sell as soon 
as the market turns, avoiding dealer status still could be a challenge.
Liqudating a Fund
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Liquidating a Fund
A Real Estate Fund will almost always have a limited life so that, when a property is 
acquired, it will be a virtual certainty that the property will be sold within a pre-
determined period.
The liquidation of a Real Estate Fund also may involve significant activity in selling 
a number of properties in a relatively short period of time.
PLRs 201340004, 201346005, and 201609004 are helpful in analyzing such 
situations. Cf. PLR 201640007 (public REIT); PLR 201707010 (public REIT).
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Liquidating a Fund
In the these PLRs, it appears that a Real Estate Fund held a significant number of 
properties through a private REIT.
REIT owned and leased residential properties to third parties.
In order to facilitate a winding up and liquidation of the Real Estate Fund, REIT 
proposed to adopt a plan of liquidation and, pursuant to that plan, dispose of all of 
its assets and liquidate.
REIT requested a ruling that the sales pursuant to the plan of liquidation would not 
give rise to prohibited transactions under section 857(b)(6).
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Liquidating a Fund
In PLR 201340004, the following representations were made to address the 
taxpayer’s purposes in holding the property:
— REIT acquired the properties with the intent to own the properties for a long-term 
holding period and to derive its profits from capital appreciation and rental income from 
the properties;
— The disposition of the properties is pursuant to a plan of liquidation;
— No individual property to be disposed of has been owned for fewer than 7 years;
— All the individual properties have been operated as rental properties for at least two 
years; and
— REIT will use one or more independent third party brokers from which REIT derives no 
income to dispose of the properties. 
PLRs 201346005 and 201609004 contain similar representations, although timing of 
holding properties is less specific.
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Liquidating a Fund
Based on these representations, the IRS ruled that the sales would not give rise to 
income from prohibited transactions.
REIT did not qualify for the prohibited transaction safe harbor, so the IRS must have 
concluded that the property would not be treated as dealer property.
40© 2018 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. 
Liquidating a Fund
In PLR 201346005, REIT held one Project that did not meet the constraints of the 
representations
— Project was a collaboration with University to develop a community that provides 
student housing. 
— A subsidiary of Taxpayer entered a joint venture in Initial Year to be the University's 
development partner for phase one of Project. 
— Due to circumstances beyond Taxpayer's control, a master ground lease for Project 
was not signed until Date 2, over d years behind schedule. 
— The intent of the parties at that time was to operate Project as rental property and 
derive profit from long-term holdings of the property. 
— Project began receiving rental income on Date 3, when part of the first phase was 
completed. 
— The last phase of Project is scheduled to be complete on Date 4. 
— The expenditures relating to the first phase account for approximately f percent of the 
total cost of Project. 
— Accordingly, by the end of Year 2, prior to the anticipated sale date of Project, Taxpayer 
will have derived rental income for 2 years from over half of the total investment in 
Project.
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Liquidating a Fund
In PLR 201346005, the IRS held that all properties considered in the ruling, including 
the Project, were sold pursuant to a plan of liquidation and such sales did not 
constitute prohibited transactions.  
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